中国重新开放：对能源市场和政策的影响（英文版）---牛津大学.pdf-solarbe文库

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February 2023 China re-opens Implications for energy markets and policies OIES ENERGY COMMENT Michal Meidan, Anders Hove, Philip Andrews-Speed, OIES The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members. 1 China Energy Brief Summary The Year of the Rabbit started on a buoyant note as the Chinese government lifted the COVID restrictions in place for the better part of three years. The government is also walking back the crackdown on the real estate and tech sectors, suggesting that a strong economic recovery lies ahead, once infections peak. But can the Chinese leadership instil confidence in its growth plans Will private entrepreneurs buy into the government’s narrative and will foreign investors flock back to China The critical question for 2023 remains one of sentiment. Policy zigzags have meant that oil product stocks have drawn down while gas shortages have emerged in northern China. With oil demand likely to grow by 0.7 mb/d this year, and gas demand by close to 30 bcm y/y, there will be more volatility in the domestic market. A classification change for diesel could mean less product exports than initially expected while crackdowns on Shandong raise questions about the government’s priorities cracking the whip or spurring growth In the power sector, China continues to add coal capacity due to the fear of repeat power outages, even though solar and wind had a strong year in 2022 and are expected to grow even more in 2023. The 2021 and 2022 power outages were driven by unique factors that are unlikely to be repeated this year, but supply security will depend on industrial demand growth this year. China’s draft solar technology export ban would prevent export of technologies used to make silicon wafers. The rule could hit Chinese firms setting up capacity outside China as well as non-Chinese companies seeking to scale up production in a field now totally dominated by Chinese manufacturers. The move, if implemented, could push other countries to further accelerate efforts to localize production in solar, batteries, and EVs. A sharp U-turn on zero-COVID A seemingly mundane announcement on 7 December 20221 signalled the end of China’s strict zero- COVID policy and paved the way for a radically different China in the Year of the Rabbit compared to that seen during the Year of the Tiger. The abrupt U-turn came shortly after protests gripped Shanghai and a number of other Chinese cities on the weekend of 26-27 November 20222, and came against the backdrop of a weakening economy. China’s leaders likely feared that hanging on to the zero-COVID policywhen facing a wave of the Omicron variant that would require strict and lengthy lockdownswould generate additional social tensions when the economy is seeing its slowest growth in decades. And so, with one fell swoop, Beijing shifted from three years of tight control to a lifting of most testing and isolation requirements. The policy reversal has come as a surprise to many and has led to a dramatic rise in infections across the country. China’s top epidemiologist on 21 January 2023 suggested 80 of the country had already been infected. While infections in large cities have gained the most attention, the situation in rural areas matters as many migrant workers rely on elderly parents in the countryside to look after their children. As infection rates rise in rural areas, migrant workers will struggle to go back to cities. The spread of COVID could remain an issue for several weeks, if not months suggesting a bumpy and uncertain recovery trajectory. 1 National Health Commission, “Notice on Further Optimising and Implementing the Prevention and Control Measures of COVID-19”, 7 December 2022, http//www.nhc.gov.cn/xcs/gzzcwj/202212/8278e7a7aee34e5bb378f0e0fc94e0f0.shtml 2 Kathy Huang, Mengyu Han, “Did China’s Street Protests End Harsh COVID Policies”, Council on Foreign Relations, 14 December 2022, https//www.cfr.org/blog/did-chinas-street-protests-end-harsh-covid-policies 2 The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members. But the zero-COVID policy is not the only thing Beijing is walking back. Government policy statements suggest the leadership is looking to fire up the economy at full speed. From pledges during the Central Economic Work Conferencethe most important Party-led annual economic meeting 3to Vice Premier Liu He’s speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos4, the message is clear China is open for business. Decision makers are signalling an end to the crackdown that squeezed the real estate sector and private entrepreneurs, a softer approach to foreign policy and an open door to foreign business. A year of two sentiments But can China engineer a strong recovery in 2023 2022 GDP growth came in at 3, compared to a staggering 8.4 in 2021 and Beijing’s target of 5.5. That said, Q4 22 GDP and macro data surprised to the upside, pointing to a quick recovery in large cities. Domestic travel during the Lunar New Year reportedly reached 226 million trips by all means of transport up by 74 compared to 2022, although this was still below pre-pandemic levels when 421 million trips were made5. Figure 1 China quarterly GDP growth rates, y/y Source NBS The Chinese government did not set a GDP growth target for 2023 at the CEWC it might still issue one during the Parliamentary sessions in March. The IMF now expects China’s GDP to grow by 5.2 y/y in 2023 revising it up from 4.4 in December 2022 6 . Yet there are concerns that structural macroeconomic factors could impede a return to the heyday of rapid growth, such as high levels of local debt and a long-term slowdown in housing demand which will hold back growth in infrastructure that had served as a main growth lever for over a decade. A recession in Europe and foreign investor concerns about the policy environment in China, combined with the fact that China’s population is shrinking and labour productivity shows few signs of improvement, all add to the long-term concerns about the economy7. But with lots of government support and some pent-up demand, 2023 could still be a very strong year, even if the rebound does not last long after 2024, and more importantly, even though it may have negative implications for China’s longer-term growth and development prospects. As the housing sector stabilises and as China’s supply chains return to normal, business sentiment within China as well as international confidence in China as a manufacturing base could improve, leading not only in a catch- up in production, but potentially a further boost in demand for manufacturing. So the low growth forecasts may prove overly pessimistic, but equally, there are still headwinds to a very strong and a lasting economic expansion. 3 EIU, “Three takeaways from China’s policy-setting conference”, 22 December 2022, https//www.eiu.com/n/three-takeaways- from-china-policy-setting-conference/ 4 Anne-Sylvaine Chassany Stephen Morris, “Beijing’s top economic adviser tells Davos CEOs ‘China is back’”, Financial Times, 19 January 2023, https//www.ft.com/content/48586b89-bf99-42dc-8e81-c8cf5646760c 5 Nectar Gan, “Lunar New Year holiday trips surge in China after lifting of Covid restrictions”, CNN, 29 January 2023, https//edition.cnn.com/2023/01/29/china/china-lunar-new-year-travel-intl-hnk/index.html 6 “IMF lifts 2023 growth forecast on China reopening, strength in U.S., Europe”, Reuters, 31 January 2023, https//www.reuters.com/markets/imf-lifts-2023-growth-forecast-china-reopening-strength-us-europe-2023-01-31/ 7 Jason Douglas, Stella Yifan Xie, “Don’t Count on China to Save the World Economy”, Wall Street Journal, 13 February 2023, https//www.wsj.com/articles/china-economy-consumer-spending-11675980834 3 The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members. At the end of the day, much hinges also on sentiment and confidence in China’s policies both within China and outside of it. Are foreign businesses confident enough in China’s trajectory and their business prospects Will the private sector buy into government messaging 2023 is therefore shaping up to be a year of two halves and of policy volatility8 9, but perhaps also a year of two sentiments bullish exuberance that China and supply chains are back, and bearish dismay about the vulnerabilities in China’s economic and socio-political system, which do seem to be at their deepest in at least a decade. Energy markets will swing between the two. Caught off guard The sharp change in policy has caught China’s energy companies off guard with localised tightness in both oil and gas emerging. While Chinese refiners had been looking to Q2 23 for growth, a surge in transport demand may lead them to focus on re-supplying the domestic market sooner than anticipated. Crude buying activity suggests a rush to source barrels for April-May delivery. Gasoline demand has grown strongly10, with travel during the Lunar New Year surprising refiners and leading to stock draws. Gasoline margins suggest molecules will stay in China for now, with exports resuming only once storage has been refilled. Diesel exports, meanwhile, have risen to meet a tight European market ahead of the Russian product ban, but even though domestic diesel use is unlikely to pick up before March, exporters may be looking to ensure domestic supplies first. Figure 2 China oil demand by select production, y/y change, mb/d Source NBS, China Customs, OIES What is more, an inspection of independent refiners could disrupt diesel supplies as the Shandong independents’ yields are diesel heavy and lead to slightly reduced run rates11, likely prompting the majors to slow their export programmes for now. In addition to tax inspections, the diesel market is tightening following the reclassification of diesel as a “hazardous material” as of 1 January 202312. The new standards mean that all diesel is now treated as a hazardous material whereas previously only diesel with a flash point below 60°C was considered hazardous. Companies involved in production, storage and trading will need to obtain new permits to handle diesel, but the added costs and more stringent operating requirements could force some out of the market. 8 OIES, “Key Themes for the Global Energy Economy in 2023”, January 2023, https//www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/key- themes-for-the-global-energy-economy-in-2023/ 9 China Energy Outlook 2023 - https//www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/oies-podcast-china-energy-outlook-2023/ 10 Trixie Sher Li Yap, Muyu Xu, “China gasoline exports may hit 8-year low in Feb on domestic demand recovery”, 10 February 2023, https//www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/china-gasoline-exports-may-hit-8-year-low-feb-domestic-demand- recovery-2023-02-10/ 11 “China to conduct nationwide inspections on oil sector”, Argus, 1 February 2023, https//direct.argusmedia.com/newsandanalysis/article/2415081 12 Trixie Sher Li Yap, “China s diesel exports may fall on new 2023 transport mandate – traders”, Reuters, 14 November 2022, https//www.reuters.com/article/asia-diesel-idUSL4N3270Q6 4 The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of its Members. Blenders could also be squeezed out of the market while buyers in the mining and infrastructure sectors that used to buy off spec diesel, will struggle to do so or need to pay a premium for it. Over time, diesel production will likely be concentrated within larger refiners, further squeezing smaller Shandong independents and blenders and improving diesel output data, but to begin with, there will likely be a fall in diesel production although some molecules could be reclassified. Overall, the tax changes and this round of inspections will allow the state-owned majors to raise runs and regain market share, stocking up ahead of their planned maintenance. Even though the oil outlook is closely linked to macroeconomic policies, it also depends on the dynamics between the independents and state-owned refiners, which in turn, is informed by licences, quotas and inspections. And the mixed signals are already impacting the sector. In early January, the government issued 109 Million tons Mt of crude import licences and 19 Mt of product exports almost half the total 2022 allowance, likely in an effort to spur growth. This flies in the face of many of the 14th Five Year Plan goals that seek to limit refining capacity growth, shift to chemicals and limit product exports while shuttering older and inefficient capacity. In 2023, if the government sticks to pro-growth policies, new refineries will be built without being offset by shutdowns, mainly in Shandong. The newly minted officials in Shandong seem to have ambitious projects for the oil sector, and hope to see the Yulong mega- refinery start up this year. While the Yulong start up would in theory require other independents in the province to shut down, the large batch of crude import licences to the Shandong independents point to an effort to generate economic activity, rather than moves to shutter them. Even though for nowthis is a positive signal for the non-state sector, it is also a complication for the 14th FYP emissions peaking efforts. The extent to which import and export quotas are a tactical support measure or a fundamental shift in China’s policies remains to be seen. Additional allowances throughout the year that allow product exports to rise significantly will be an important sign to watch, but this round of inspections suggest that there are still parts of the central and local governments that are pursuing efforts to clean up the sector. A debate seems to be underway between the Ministry of Commerce, that is favouring higher export quotas to bolster growth, and the National Development and Reform Commission NDRC which is overseeing the carbon peaking plans. Mixed signals continue to catch the sector off guard and seem set to be a hallmark of 2023. This requires frequent adjustments from the majors in terms of crude buying and product export strategies, but also suggests that the market could go from feast to famine in very short succession. Foot off the gas A somewhat similar situation is unfolding in the gas market. Demand in the North from residential users and the transport sector has recovered strongly with suppliers struggling to catch up. Partial privatization alongside price controls are once again limiting supplies. Local distribution companies, some of which have been privatized, failed to secure competitively-priced gas from ups