IEA：全球能源展望2020-solarbe文库

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World Energy Outlook 2020 Executive Summary World Energy Outlook 2020 www.iea.org/weo Executive Summary The IEA examines the full spectrum of energy issues including oil, gas and coal supply and demand, renewable energy technologies, electricity markets, energy efficiency, access to energy, demand side management and much more. Through its work, the IEA advocates policies that will enhance the reliability, affordability and sustainability of energy in its 30 member countries, 8 association countries and beyond. Please note that this publication is subject to specific restrictions that limit its use and distribution. The terms and conditions are available online at www.iea.org/tc/ Source IEA. All rights reserved. International Energy Agency Website www.iea.org IEA member countries Australia Austria Belgium Canada Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States The European Commission also participates in the work of the IEA IEA association countries Brazil China India Indonesia Morocco Singapore South Africa Thailand INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY Executive Summary 17 Executive Summary The Covid-19 pandemic has caused more disruption to the energy sector than any other event in recent history, leaving impacts that will be felt for years to come. This IEA World Energy Outlook WEO examines in detail the effects of the pandemic, and in particular how it affects the prospects for rapid clean energy transitions. It is too soon to say whether today’s crisis represents a setback for efforts to bring about a more secure and sustainable energy system, or a catalyst that accelerates the pace of change. The pandemic is far from over, many uncertainties remain and crucial energy policy decisions have yet to be made. This Outlook explores different pathways out of the Covid-19 crisis, with a particular focus on a pivotal next ten years to 2030. At this hugely consequential moment for the energy sector and for the urgent global response to climate change, the WEO-2020 illustrates the historic nature of the choices, opportunities and pitfalls that will shape where we go from here. A huge shock to the system Our assessment is that global energy demand is set to drop by 5 in 2020, energy-related CO 2 emissions by 7, and energy investment by 18. The impacts vary by fuel. The estimated falls of 8 in oil demand and 7 in coal use stand in sharp contrast to a slight rise in the contribution of renewables. The reduction in natural gas demand is around 3, while global electricity demand looks set to be down by a relatively modest 2 for the year. The 2.4 gigatonnes Gt decline takes annual CO 2 emissions back to where they were a decade ago. However, the initial signs are that there may not have been a similar fall in 2020 in emissions of methane – a powerful greenhouse gas – from the energy sector, despite lower oil and gas output. There is no single storyline about the future Uncertainty over the duration of the pandemic, its economic and social impacts, and the policy responses open up a wide range of possible energy futures. By considering different assumptions about these key unknowns, along with the latest energy market data and a dynamic representation of energy technologies, this Outlook examines  The Stated Policies Scenario STEPS, in which Covid-19 is gradually brought under control in 2021 and the global economy returns to pre-crisis levels the same year. This scenario reflects all of today’s announced policy intentions and targets, insofar as they are backed up by detailed measures for their realisation.  The Delayed Recovery Scenario DRS is designed with the same policy assumptions as in the STEPS, but a prolonged pandemic causes lasting damage to economic prospects. The global economy returns to its pre-crisis size only in 2023, and the pandemic ushers in a decade with the lowest rate of energy demand growth since the 1930s.  In the Sustainable Development Scenario SDS, a surge in clean energy policies and investment puts the energy system on track to achieve sustainable energy objectives in full, including the Paris Agreement, energy access and air quality goals. The assumptions on public health and the economy are the same as in the STEPS. IEA. All rights reserved. 18 World Energy Outlook 2020  The new Net Zero Emissions by 2050 case NZE2050 extends the SDS analysis. A rising number of countries and companies are targeting net-zero emissions, typically by mid- century. All of these are achieved in the SDS, putting global emissions on track for net zero by 2070. The NZE2050 includes the first detailed IEA modelling of what would be needed in the next ten years to put global CO 2 emissions on track for net zero by 2050. The shadow of the pandemic looms large Global energy demand rebounds to its pre-crisis level in early 2023 in the STEPS, but this is delayed until 2025 in the event of a prolonged pandemic and deeper slump, as in the DRS. Prior to the crisis, energy demand was projected to grow by 12 between 2019 and 2030. Growth over this period is now 9 in the STEPS, and only 4 in the DRS. With demand in advanced economies on a declining trend, all of the increase comes from emerging market and developing economies, led by India. The slower pace of energy demand growth puts downward pressure on oil and gas prices compared with pre-crisis trajectories, although the large falls in investment in 2020 also increase the possibility of future market volatility. Lower growth in incomes cuts into construction activities and reduces purchases of new appliances and cars, with the effects on livelihoods concentrated in developing economies. In the DRS, residential floor space is 5 lower by 2040, 150 million fewer refrigerators are in use, and there are 50 million fewer cars on the road than in the STEPS. The worst effects are felt among the most vulnerable Reversing several years of progress, our analysis shows that the number of people without access to electricity in sub-Saharan Africa is set to rise in 2020. Around 580 million people in sub-Saharan Africa lacked access to electricity in 2019, three-quarters of the global total, and some of the impetus behind efforts to improve this situation has been lost. Governments are attending to the immediate public health and economic crisis, utilities and other entities that deliver access face serious financial strains, and borrowing costs have risen significantly in countries where the access deficit is high. Regaining momentum on this issue is particularly challenging in the DRS. In addition, we estimate that a rise in poverty levels worldwide may have made basic electricity services unaffordable for more than 100 million people who already had electricity connections, pushing these households back to relying on more polluting and inefficient sources of energy. Solar becomes the new king of electricity Renewables grow rapidly in all our scenarios, with solar at the centre of this new constellation of electricity generation technologies. Supportive policies and maturing technologies are enabling very cheap access to capital in leading markets. With sharp cost reductions over the past decade, solar PV is consistently cheaper than new coal- or gas- fired power plants in most countries, and solar projects now offer some of the lowest cost electricity ever seen. In the STEPS, renewables meet 80 of the growth in global electricity demand to 2030. Hydropower remains the largest renewable source of electricity, but solar is the main driver of growth as it sets new records for deployment each year after 2022, IEA. All rights reserved. Executive Summary 19 followed by onshore and offshore wind. The advance of renewable sources of generation, and of solar in particular, as well as the contribution of nuclear power, is much stronger in the SDS and NZE2050. The pace of change in the electricity sector puts an additional premium on robust grids and other sources of flexibility, as well as reliable supplies of the critical minerals and metals that are vital to its secure transformation. Storage plays an increasingly vital role in ensuring the flexible operation of power systems, with India becoming the largest market for utility-scale battery storage. but the downturn creates risks for the backbone of today’s power systems Electricity grids could prove to be the weak link in the transformation of the power sector, with implications for the reliability and security of electricity supply. The projected requirement for new transmission and distribution lines worldwide in the STEPS is 80 greater over the next decade than the expansion seen over the last ten years. The importance of electricity networks rises even more in faster energy transitions. However, the financial health of many utilities, especially in developing economies, has worsened as a result of the crisis. There is a disparity in many countries between the spending required for smart, digital and flexible electricity networks and the revenues available to grid operators, creating a risk to the adequacy of investment under today’s regulatory structures. Covid-19 has catalysed a structural fall in global coal demand Coal demand does not return to pre-crisis levels in the STEPS and its share in the 2040 energy mix falls below 20 for the first time since the Industrial Revolution. Coal use for power generation is heavily affected by downward revisions in electricity demand and its use in industry is tempered by lower economic activity. Coal phase-out policies, the rise of renewables and competition from natural gas lead to the retirement of 275 gigawatts GW of coal-fired capacity worldwide by 2025 13 of the 2019 total, including 100 GW in the United States and 75 GW in the European Union. Projected increases in coal demand in developing economies in Asia are markedly lower than in previous WEOs, and not enough to offset falls elsewhere. The share of coal in the global power generation mix falls from 37 in 2019 to 28 in 2030 in the STEPS, and to 15 by then in the SDS. but without an additional policy push, it is too soon to see a rapid decline of oil The era of growth in global oil demand comes to an end within ten years, but the shape of the economic recovery is a key uncertainty. In both the STEPS and the DRS, oil demand flattens out in the 2030s. However, a prolonged economic downturn knocks more than 4 million barrels per day mb/d off oil demand in the DRS, compared with the STEPS, keeping it below 100 mb/d. Changes in behaviour resulting from the pandemic cut both ways. The longer the disruption, the more some changes that eat into oil consumption become engrained, such as working from home or avoiding air travel. However, not all the shifts in consumer behaviour disadvantage oil. It benefits from a near-term aversion to public transport, the continued popularity of SUVs and the delayed replacement of older, inefficient vehicles. IEA. All rights reserved. 20 World Energy Outlook 2020 In the absence of a larger shift in policies, it is still too early to foresee a rapid decline in oil demand. Rising incomes in emerging market and developing economies create strong underlying demand for mobility, offsetting reductions in oil use elsewhere. But transport fuels are no longer a reliable engine for growth. Oil use for passenger cars peaks in both the STEPS and the DRS, brought lower by continued improvements in fuel efficiency and robust growth in sales of electric cars. Oil use for longer-distance freight and shipping varies according to the outlook for the global economy and international trade. Upward pressure on oil demand increasingly depends on its rising use as a feedstock in the petrochemical sector. Despite an anticipated rise in recycling rates, there is still plenty of scope for demand for plastics to rise, especially in developing economies. However, since oil used to make plastics is not combusted, our scenarios see a peak in total oil-related CO 2 emissions. Looking beyond the glut long-term policy questions for natural gas Natural gas fares better than other fossil fuels, but different policy contexts produce strong variations. In the STEPS, a 30 rise in global natural gas demand by 2040 is concentrated in South and East Asia. Policy priorities in these regions – notably a push to improve air quality and to support growth in manufacturing – combine with lower prices to underpin the expansion of gas infrastructure. By contrast, this is the first WEO in which the STEPS projections show gas demand in advanced economies going into slight decline by 2040. An uncertain economic recovery also raises questions about the future prospects of the record amount of new liquefied natural gas export facilities approved in 2019. Greater transparency on methane emissions seems to be on the way, with implications for the environmental credentials of different sources of gas. In carbon-intensive economies, natural gas continues to benefit from lower emissions, compared with coal. However, this is less of an asset in countries planning a pathway to net-zero emissions, where coal is often already in decline. Methane emissions along gas supply chains – as highlighted in the IEA’s Methane Tracker – remain a crucial uncertainty, although better data from companies and from aerial measurements, including from satellites, should soon improve understanding of the sources of leaks from across the energy sector. In Europe in the STEPS, and in all parts of the world in the SDS, the challenge for the gas industry is to retool itself for a different energy future. This can come via demonstrable progress with methane abatement, via alternative gases such as biomethane and low-carbon hydrogen, and technologies like carbon capture, utilisation and storage CCUS. Major dilemmas facing oil and gas producers, and risks to investment Lower prices and downward revisions to demand, resulting from the pandemic, have cut around one-quarter off the value of future oil and gas production. Many oil and gas producers, notably those in the Middle East and Africa such as Iraq and Nigeria, are facing acute fiscal pressures as a result of high reliance on hydrocarbon revenues. Now, more than ever, fundamental efforts to diversify and reform the economies of some major oil and gas exporters look unavoidable. The US shale industry has met nearly 60 of the increase in global oil and gas demand over the last ten years, but this rise was fuelled by easy credit that has now dried up. So far in 2020, leading oil and gas companies have IEA. All rights reserved. Executive Summary 21 reduced the reported worth of their assets by more than 50 billion, a palpable expression of a shift in perceptions about the future. Investment in oil and gas suppl